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Bonn 
20 December 1983 
Policy Statement and Majority De-
cision in the German Bundestag 
Yes to 
Deployment 
and 
to 
Further 
Negotiations 
~ I strongly welcome the 
willingness of the United Sta-
tes to continue the negotia-
tions. We are agreed that great 
importance continues to at-
tach to East-West co-opera-
tion.~ 
From a statement made byChancellorHelmut 
Kohl on the occasion of the Franco-German 
consultations in Bonn on 25 November1983. 
At a reception for the Diplomatic Corps in Bonn on 28 November 1983, Chancellor Kohl under-
scored his government's strong desire for an active and comprehensive dialogue between East 
and West (excerpts from his speech on the last page). He is shown heretalkingtoSovietAmbas-
sador Vladimir Semyonov and U.S. Ambassador Arthur F. Bums. 
Freedom 
Is the 
Prerequisite 
for Peace 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl's policy 
statement to the German Bundes-
tag on the NATO two-track deci-
sion and on the current state of 
the INF negotiations in Geneva, 
21 November 1983 
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Today we are again holding a major deb-
ate on the crucial question of how peace 
and freedom can be safeguarded in our 
country and in Western Europe. Whoev-
er speaks of peace must allow himselfto 
be judged by the yardstick of freedom. 
Freedom is the prerequisite for peace. It 
cannot be the price of peace. Whoever is 
prepared to risk freedom for the sake of 
peace will lose both. 
Threatened by internal and external 
pressure and struggling for freedom and 
human rights, the Polish bishops last 
year called to mind a truth that applies at 
all times and everywhere: "To invoke 
freedom is the right of every individual 
and every nation. It is a task facing every 
individual and every nation. We regard 
freedom and the peace connected with it 
as a product of conscious and well-con-
sidered action." 
Safeguarding peace in freedom conti-
nues to be the dominant task of our time. 
This responsibility guides us in the de-
bates we hold and the decisions we have 
to take. 
We are all in favour of peace. The conten-
tious issue is how best to preserve 
peace. 
The guiding principle of my action conti-
nues to be, as I said in my policy state-
ment of 4 May, to create peace with ever 
fewer weapons. 
The NATO two-track decision does not 
primarily involve the technical side of ar-
maments, i.e. not simply the question of 
whether one type of weapon is to be re-
placed by another. 
The decision concerns an equilibrium of 
forces and hence the foundation of 
peace in Europe. 
It concerns the question of whether arms 
control can help to establish a stable bal-
ance at a low level. 
It concerns the question of whether our 
partners in the Alliance, an association 
marked by solidarity, can continue to de-
pend on the Federal Republic of Germa-
ny, and we on them. 
It concerns the question of whether the 
Alliance can, on the basis of trusting and 
friendly relations between Western Eu-
rope and the United States and Canada, 
continue in the final years of this century 
to fulfil its task of safeguarding peace 
and freedom. 
Rnally, the decision essentially con-
cerns the question of whether or not the 
Federal Republic of Germany is pre-
pared and able, together with its Allies, to 
oppose the Soviet Union's claim to supe-
riority. 
Our country's orientation in external af-
fairs is at stake. The Soviet Union must 
not be allowed, through its vast arms ef-
forts, unwarranted by any perceivable 
defence or security needs, 
- to intimidate us Western Europeans, 
- to narrow our scope for political action, 
and 
- to separate us from the United States. 
Only if we can prevent this will the door 
remain open for a peaceful order in Eu-
rope founded on justice and not on force. 
Only a peaceful orderofthis kind can de-
finitively safeguard peace. The Soviet 
Union, too, should begin to recognize 
this. 
It is the Soviet Union's political will that 
makes us feel threatened. Weapons are 
inanimate objects. 
Defensive Alliance 
They do not threaten anyone.lt is the po-
litical will behind them that creates ten-
sion. Let us not forget this when discus-
sing the two-track decision. 
Ours is a defence alliance. This has been 
borne out in its 30-year history. In the 
Bonn declaration of 10 June 1982 the At-
lantic Alliance reaffirmed that "None of 
our weapons will ever be used except in 
response to attack." 
Our own commitment to the non-use of 
force is supplemented by the moral obli-
gation to deter others from attacking us. 
The fundamental goal of the Atlantic Alli-
ance continues to consist in preventing 
war so as to safeguard peace and free-
dom. The most reliable and hitherto the 
only guarantee of this is deterrence in-
volving nuclear weapons. 
It is our aim to prevent any type of war, 
nuclear or conventional, since conventi-
onal weapons, too, have devastating ef-
fects. We remain dependent on nuclear 
deterrence if only because of the enor-
mous conventional threat. 
I am aware of the fear and qualms that 
greatly trouble many people due to the 
fact that we are all familiar with the terrify-
ing effects of nuclear weapons. Our poli-
tical and moral responsibility is therefore 
all the greater to create conditions that 
prevent the use of these and other wea-
pons. 
Peace in the nuclear age will, however, 
only be secure as long as there is cer-
tainty that whoever breaches it will suffer 
destruction. A unilateral renunciation of 
deterrence would, therefore, be an incal-
culable risk. Peace and freedom are too 
valuable an asset to take such risks. 
For the time being we will have to carry on 
living with nuclear weapons and, as 
such, with the immense tension between 
their destructive power, on the one hand, 
and their peace-keeping effects, on the 
other. 
In order to assess correctly the political 
and strategic significance of the NATO 
two-track decision, we must look back. 
In the early 1960s the strategic nuclear 
situation between the two superpowers 
was characterized by the United States' 
overwhelming superiority in interconti-
nental nuclear weapons. In Europe both 
powers possessed intermediate-range 
missiles. 
From 1963 onwards, however, the Ameri-
cans withdrew their intermediate-range 
missiles from Europe. They also reduced 
to one quarter the strategic nuclear des-
tructive potential that they possessed in 
the1960s. 
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, not 
only retained its Eurostrategic potential, 
but, as we all know, developed it into an 
independent power factor in Europe 
from the early 1970s onwards. 
These two opposing trends intersected 
in 197 4 when the two superpowers 
enshrined in the Vladivostok declaration 
the strategic nuclear parity attained by 
the Soviet Union. However, in contrast to 
Salt I, the intermediate-range potential 
was not covered by this declaration. 
At the Sa.me time it became clear to the 
Europeans that the strategic nuclear 
parity ot the two superpowers was a 
double-edged sword for Western Eu-
rope. 
- For the United States and the Soviet 
Union, parity in intercontinental wea-
pons means stable deterrence. 
Through the use of these weapons 
neither side can gain anything, but 
could lose everything. 
- For the Europeans and for us Ger-
mans, however, the loss of strategic 
nuclear superiority on the part of the 
United States is one of the gravest de-
velopments of the last two decades. In 
Europe there is no longer anything to 
counterbalance the Warsaw Pact's 
conventional superiority and the So-
viet Union's Eurostrategic threat. 
Canceller Kohl and 
Foreign Minister 
Genscher on the go-
vernment bench be-
fore the vote was ta-
ken on the resolution 
proposed by the 
CDU/CSU and FDP. 
Flexible Strategy 
The Alliance soon took account ofthese 
changes by progressively transforming 
its strategy of massive retaliation into 
one of flexible response. However, the 
necessary funds were not made avail-
able. 
- The Warsaw Pact's conventional su-
periority still exists today. 
-NATO still does not possess ground-
launched intermediate-range nuclear 
weapons, I.e. those weapons needed 
under Alliance strategy to assure de-
terrence at all levels. 
Western Europe is thus in a different si-
tuation than the United States in terms of 
security. We are threatened by the con-
ventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact. 
We are also threatened by SS 20-inter-
mediate-range missiles, a potential for 
nuclear blackmail that is constantly 
growing. These missiles are trained on 
European cities, not on American ones. 
The Soviet Union seeks to threaten us 
Europeans and at the same time stop the 
United States from protecting us. 
Rnally, we are threatened by Soviet in-
tercontinental missiles that can be used 
against North America and Europe. 
The two-track decision of December 
1979 is designed to redress this danger-
ous imbalance for us Europeans. In the 
future the Soviet Union will have the 
choice of accepting the same dual nu-
clear threat as Western Europe, i.e. the 
threat of intercontinental and interme-
diate-range missiles, of foregoing Euro-
strategic weapons together with NATO 
or of reducing them to the lowest pos-
sible level. 
With its two-track decision the Atlantic 
Alliance forewent for a period of 4 years 
any effort to respond to the Soviet arms 
build-up with the deployment of equival-
ent weapons. It thus made a unilateral 
concession unprecedented in history. 
The Soviet Union is in the process of de-
stroying a historic opportunity by rigidly 
opposing this new and courageous ap-
proach to disarmament. 
For us, two crucial political questions de-
rive from the Eurostrategic threat posed 
by the Soviet Union. 
1. Are the Soviet Union's efforts to de-
grade Western Europe into a zone of 
reduced security compatible with our 
security and our political indepen-
dence? 
2. Is the Soviet Union to be allowed tore-
tain an instrument with which it can 
determine the fate of Europe? 
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The debate on these questions and 
hence on the NATO two-track decision 
touches upon the life nerves of the 
peoples of Europe. Everyone senses 
that fundamental aspects of our security 
are at stake. Let me repeat in this context 
what I said before this house in my policy 
statement on 4 May 1983: 
"We cannot eliminate nuclear weapons 
from the face of the earth overnight. Uni-
lateral renunciation of such weapons 
would not reduce the nuclear threat di-
rected towards us, but only increase the 
danger of war. There is only one way out 
of this dilemma. We must drastically re-
duce the number of nuclear weapons on 
both sides, those which threaten our 
existence and those which we are now 
forced to maintain in the interest of our 
security." 
As long as there is no comprehensive 
disarmament to render military means of 
safeguarding peace superfluous, we re-
main dependent on the tried-and-true 
Alliance strategy of deterrence and de-
fence on the basis of equilibrium, astra-
tegy in which, like the Alliance's armed 
forces, the nations of the Alliance have 
confidence. This security policy has for 
decades received the backing of our 
people and our democratic parties. Our 
country's voice in the Alliance has been 
clear and our position undisputed. 
On 26 May 1981 a resolution sponsored 
by the Government headed by Chancel-
lor Schmidt at the time was adopted by 
the Bundestag with only 5 votes against 
and 6 abstentions. This resolution stat-
ed, inter alia, that: 
Expression of the 
Harmel Report 
"The German Bundestag supports the 
Federal Government in the systematic 
and timely implementation of both parts 
of the NATO decision of 12 December 
1979. In this context the Bundestag 
stresses that the West will examine NA-
TO's INF requirements in the light of con-
crete results reached through negotia-
tions." 
In that debate the Chairman of the Social 
Democratic Party, Willy Brandt, ap-
pealed to Moscow: "Stop your arms 
build-up, eliminate your superiority, and 
then we will not need to modernize our 
weapons." 
The parliamentary group ofthe Christian 
Democratic and Christi~n Social Union 
supported that resolution. My Govern-
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• ment has continued this course.l perso-
nally have declared on various occa-
sions that I consider myself bound by 
both parts of the NATO decision. The 
conditions prevailing at that time conti-
nue to apply to both parts oft he decision. 
The two-track decision led to the Geneva 
talks. It defines the requirements, condi-
tions and goals ofthe Western negotiat-
ing position. The decision is a concrete 
expression of the Harmel Report of1967, 
which clearly and cogently describes 
the Alliance's political concept, a con-
cept founded on the interlinkage of milit-
ary security and a policy of detente. 
The present Government is continuing 
the course embarked upon by its prede-
cessor and following the line of the At-
lantic Alliance. 
In order to make agreement possible, the 
United States has continued to develop 
its position at the INF talks in Geneva in 
the closest possible consultation with its 
NATO partners. 
1. In November 1981 President Reagan 
proposed that both sides should 
forego the entire category of ground-
launched, long-range INF and their 
launchers. His proposal was based 
on the earnest conviction that this 
mutual zero option would best serve 
our security interests and those of the 
Soviet Union. I continue to find it re-
grettable that the Soviet Union still re-
fuses to accept this proposal. 
2. In March 1983 the United States sug-
gested an interim agreement be-
cause the Soviet Union was evidently 
not prepared, unlike the West, to 
Pierre Harmel, Belgian Foreign Minister from 
1966 to 1972. 
forego Intermediate-range missiles. 
This new proposal met the Soviet 
Union half-way in that it envisaged an 
equal number of warheads between 
50 and 450 for each side. 
3. Since this proposal for an interim 
agreement was also rejected by the 
Soviet leadership, President Reagan 
submitted new proposals in Septem-
ber1983 responding to concrete con-
cerns of the Soviet Union. The United 
States is prepared. 
- to counterbalance only the Soviet 
INF potential in Europe, provided 
that a global ceiling is agreed on, 
- to negotiate not only on intermedia-
te-range missiles but also on air-
. craft of the same range, and 
- in the event of a reduction oft he de-
ployment requirement, to reduce 
the number of missiles and Persh-
Ing lis proportionately. 
A week ago President Reagan enlarged 
on this proposal of September1983 and 
gave specific figures. 
During the first year of my Government 
the West submitted three substantive 
proposals. The Soviet Union hasclungto 
its maximum demands. It continues to 
seek to prevent the deployment of Ame-
rican INF in Europe and to safeguard its 
monopoly in ground-launched IN F. 
From the very outset the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany has taken an active and 
constructive part in the progressive de-
velopment of the American position in 
Geneva I personally have made every ef-
fort to ensure that every possibility of 
compromise compatible with the secur-
ity interests of the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Alliance is sounded 
out in Geneva In so doing I have con-
stantly been in close personal contact 
with President Reagan in order to con-
sult on all details for the talks in Geneva. 
Let me state quite clearly that the close 
consultations . between the United 
States and ourselves on the Geneva 
talks are unique in German-American re-
lations. 
In this context I have in mind not only the 
national interests of the Federal Repub-
lic ofGermany.l have also striven to bring 
our weight to bearforWestern Europe. At 
the same time, the Federal Republic of 
Germany has remained a cornerstone of 
the Alliance on which the United States 
can depend for its conduct of the talks 
and for deployment in the event that So-
viet intransigence ultimately forces us to 
take such action. This clear-cut position 
was, and remains, vital. The NATO two-
track decision is today a touchstone of 
NATO's capacity to act and its will to as-
sert itself. Outside the Alliance people 
are watching with concern to see, whe-
ther the free Western world will have the 
strength and resolve to resist the Soviet 
Union and assert its security interests. 
Many countries know that they would 
not be spared the repercussions that 
would be triggered by a weakening of 
NATO in the East-West framework. 
Respect of Legitimate 
Security Interests 
What is the current situation at the bar-
gaining table? 
With his proposals of 22 September and 
14 November 1983 President Reagan in-
dicated possible solutions for all deci-
sive problems, solutions that do justice 
to the Soviet Union's main concerns. 
General Secretary Andropov took up 
these proposals in his reply of 28 Octob-
er 1983. The problems have not yet been 
solved. However a basis exists for a ne-
gotiated compromise. The Soviet Union 
has systematically clung to its maximum 
demands from the outset. It has ob-
structed the negotiations for months 
now with its demand that British and 
French systems be included. I hope that 
the signs coming from Geneva indicate a 
change in the Soviet position. 
We, for our part, cannot accept this de-
mand. 
- In essence it amounts to preventing 
American nuclear presence in Europe 
and, in the long run, driving the United 
States out of Europe. 
-It deprives us, as a non-nuclear-wea-
pon State, ofthe nuclear shield afford-
ed by the United States. 
- It denies the Alliance the means need-
ed to carry out its strategy and thus 
seeks to decouple Europe from the 
United States. 
I continue to believe that the way has 
been paved for an agreement. But this is 
contingent on the Soviet Union aban-
doning its maximum demand, the goal of 
securing a monopoly in ground-
launched missiles targeted on Western 
Europe. 
In my speech to this high house on 9 
June 1983 I outlined the criteria for a ne-
gotiated settlement. Let me reiterate 
them. 
Petra Kelly, the spokeswoman ofthe small opposition Green Party (28 deputies), vehemently re-
jected the deployment of INF missles in the Federal Republic. The Greens declared teir support 
of those parts ofthe peace movementthat advocate a nuclear-free West Germany and a possible 
withdrawal of the Federal Republic from NATO. 
(1) We are willing to respect the Soviet 
Union's legimate security interests. 
However, we are not willing to accept 
the transformation of Europe into a 
zone of reduced security. 
(2) Effective arms control agreements 
must rest on the principle of equality 
and must be verifiable. 
(3) Consideration ofthe French and Brit-
ish systems has no place in INF ne-
gotiations. 
(4) We seek a reduction to zero of the 
Soviet intermediate-range arsenals 
targeted on Europe and are willing, in 
return, to forego the deployment of 
American intermediate-range wea-
pons. If no result is achieved be-
cause the Soviet Union is not ready 
to agree, then the missiles will be de-
ployed in accordance with the two-
track decision. If an interim solution 
is reached, then the scale of the de-
ployment of missiles will depend on 
the concrete results of the negotia-
tions. 
(5) A removal ofthe Soviet Union's inter-
mediate-range nuclear arsenal to 
the Far East is not acceptable. 
(6) We continue to call on the Soviet 
Union not to prevent an agreement 
by establishing a new hegemonic 
instrument of power against its Asian 
neighbours as a result of its arms 
build-up in the Far East and thus, at 
the same time, a transferable poten-
tial that could be used against We-
stem Europe. 
I have reiterated these criteria in order to 
make two points clear: 
(1) The Federal Government presented 
at an early stage its ideas on a nego-
tiated result to the Bundestag. To-
day's debate is a follow-up to this 
earlier presentation. 
(2) On this issue the Federal Govern-
ment has pursued a constructive 
course. Ever since the day on which 
we came to office this Government 
has exerted its influence on the Ame-
rican negotiating position. The close 
personal consultations with Presid-
ent Reagan are unparalleled in Ger-
man post-war history. Unparalleled, 
too, are the close consultations with-
in the Alliance. 
We have continually striven to ensure 
that all opportunities for negotiation are 
kept open, even after the start of deploy-
ment. Deployment will not create an irre-
versible situation. The Alliance is pre-
pared to dismantle any systems de-
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ployed once an agreement is achieved. 
The Soviet Union does not have any 
cause to leave the bargaining table now. 
The West carried on negotiating whilst 
the Soviet Union continued its build-up 
of SS-20 missiles. The Soviet Union 
spoke of a moratorium, whilstthe West in 
fact observed a moratorium for over four 
years and made a unilateral concession • 
by not deploying any missiles. 
Comprehensive 
Disarmament Offer 
The West has submitted to the Soviet 
Union the most comprehensive set of 
disarmament proposals in history. 
- In the negotiations on intercontinental 
strategic weapons, the United States 
has offered not only to make drastic 
cuts in the number of launchers but, 
above all, to reduce by 40 per cent the 
number of warheads on ground and 
sea-launched missiles. 
- At the Vienna MBFR talks on mutual 
and balanced force reductions in Cen-
tral Europe, the United States has, to-
gether with us and the other European 
partners, presented a detailed draft 
agreement. This is intended to ensure 
a verifiable reduction of the two Allian-
ces' ground and air forces to 900,000 
on each side in the area of reductions. 
- In the Geneva Committee on Disarma-
ment the West is working for an agree-
ment that prohibits, on a verifiable ba-
sis, the production and stockpiling of 
all chemical weapons. 
- On 17 January 1984, the Conference 
on Confidence and Security-Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe 
is due to start in Stockholm. This con-
ference is the result of a Western initia-
tive. 
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In 1980 NATO unilaterally withdrew 
1 ,000 nuclear warheads from Europe as 
part of the two-track decision. Another 
1 ,400 warheads are yet to be withdrawn. 
In this fashion NATO is reducing by one-
third the number of its nuclear warheads 
in Europe. 
There could be no more cogent testi-
mony of our policy of creating peace with 
ever fewer weapons than this great num-
ber of disarmament initiatives. 
We are striving for balanced disarma-
ment because we need to release re-
sources to provide relief, especially in 
the developing countries. It is nonsensi-
cal and cannot be a matter of indiffer-
ence to us that arms expenditure is rising 
worldwide, whilst hundreds of millions of 
people are suffering from hunger. For 
me, this is a crucial reason for urging that 
progress be made in balanced disarma-
ment and arms control. 
There can be no swift, radical solutions to 
these problems. What is essential in dis-
armament and arms control are perse-
verance, staying power and patience. 
With his personal commitment to the 
most comprehensive Western disarma-
ment programme thus far President Rea-
gan has given all those the lie who have 
suggested that he treats the security of 
the European allies differently than the 
security of the United States. 
In his speech to the Japanese Diet on 1 0 
November 1983 President Reagan stat-
ed unequivocally: 
"A nuclear war can never be won and 
must never be fought. The only value in 
possessing nuclear weapons is to make 
sure that they cannot be used- ever." 
The West has time and again demon-
strated its readiness for disarmament 
and arms control. Nonetheless, we are 
constantly faced only with proposals for 
unilateral renunciation and concessions 
by the West. What we have already fore-
gone cannot be the subject of negotia-
tions. How then is the threat posed by 
the Warsaw Pact to be eliminated? 
Our security and the protection of our 
freedom now demand that we proceed 
with the deployment of the new Ameri-
can intermediate-range missiles. We do 
this in awareness of the solidarity within 
the Alliance, whose members have com-
mitted themselves, with us, to this de-
ployment. From the very beginning 
NATO has set qualitative and quantita-
tive limits to deployment. 
Door to Negotiations 
Remains Open 
It is thus clear that we have no intention 
of creating a threat to the Soviet Union, 
but that we are limiting the necessary 
measures to the minimum essential for 
our security. For every missile which is 
now installed, one other nuclear weapon 
will be withdrawn from Europe. 
The Soviet Union knows that. It also 
knows that at the end of the year, when 
the first units are operational, there are 
still five years for a negotiated result to be 
obtained which would limit or reverse the 
installation of these missiles. 
The start of deployment has not closed 
the door to negotiations. The West is 
ready to go on negotiating for as long as it 
takes to find a compromise acceptable 
to both sides. 
A few days before this debate, the Soviet 
Union signalled in Geneva that it might 
be ready to give up its present position 
and negotiate on the British and French 
systems with the relevant States in an-
other forum. 
I am certain that persistence, tenacious 
and constructive negotiating as well as 
defence of our own security interests in 
conjunction with acknowledgement of 
the legitimate security requirements of 
the other side will lead to results. 
The Soviet Union continues to pursue 
the aim of preventing the deployment of 
American intermediate-range systems 
in Europe altogether while preserving its 
own missile monopoly. This remains 
unacceptable to us. 
However, latest developments show that 
even the Soviet Union recognizes that 
the inclusion of the British and French 
systems in INF represents an artificial 
problem of its own creation. 
If the Soviet Union really showed willing-
ness to compromise, it ought to be pos-
sible to agree upon a balance between 
the Soviet systems remaining after re-
ductions and the American systems be-
ing deployed, thus satisfying our de-
mand for the lowest possible yet ba-
lanced level of arms for both the United 
States and the Soviet Union. 
.... 
Let me say it again. There are no grounds 
for the Soviet Union to walk away from 
the negotiating table.lt can have a settle-
ment if it truely desires one. 
A continuation of negotiations is in the 
Soviet Union's own true interest. 
Once again I call upon the Soviet leader-
ship not to entrench itself behind rigid 
principles, but to take action to make a 
negotiated agreement possible. 
The Soviet Union maintains that the start 
of deployment will force it to take "coun-
ter-measures". This claim is further evid-
ence that the Soviet Union is prepared to 
use nuclear weapons to exert political 
pressure. 
Furthermore, we know that the short-
range nuclear arms programme de-
scribed as a "counter-measure" has 
been under preparation for several 
years. The time needed to develop these 
weapon systems amounts to eight to ten 
years. They were produced completely 
independently ofthe NATO INF decision, 
and it is now intended to provide post 
factum justification to the public. 
Negotiations on intermediate-range 
weapons are an important element ofthe 
East-West security dialogue. 
They are part of our effort to reach an 
overall East-West balance and to conso-
lidate peace in Europe. 
The Federal Government has woven a 
close network of talks and negotiations 
with the Soviet Union and the German 
Democratic Republic. Time and again we 
have been able to obtain substantial pro-
gress by this method. The agreements of 
recent weeks bear particular witness to 
this fact. East-West relations must not be 
restricted to the missile question alone. 
The offer I made in my policy statement of 
4 May 1983 still stands. We want to attain 
relations with the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact countries that are of a new 
and better quality. Our policy is a policy 
of goodwill and the best of intentions. 
As I recently wrote to General Secretary 
Honecker, it is my conviction thatthetwo 
States in Germany should commit them-
selves with all their strength to improving 
and developing their network of links and 
co-operation, particularly at times when 
the international situation is more diffi-
cult. It is precisely because of our histori-
cal experience that we Germans bear a 
special responsibility for the mainten-
ance of peace. 
We remain willing to pursue dialogue and 
co-operation in all spheres on the basis 
of the agreements concluded with the 
Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and the German Democratic Republic. 
Through these agreements the Federal 
Republic of Germany made the renun-
ciation of force the central element of its 
policy for peace. 
The nations of East and West would not 
accept the abandonment of this process 
which we have hitherto pursued toge-
ther. 
Philosophy of the Alliance 
The Federal Government stands unre-
servedly by both elements of the Harmel 
Report. According to the report, the At-
lantic Alliance has two main functions. 
- One consists in maintaining sufficient 
military strength and political solidar-
ity. 
- The other function consists in continu-
ing the search for progress in estab-
lishing a lasting relationship between 
East and West by means of which fun-
damental political issues can be 
settled. 
Military security and ·a policy of de-
tente are not a contradiction in terms, 
but rather complement each other. 
It was the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 
the time, Willy Brandt, who agreed to the 
Harmel Report in December 1967 on be-
half of the Federal Government. The two-
track decision of the Alliance was a logi-
cal consequence of this report. 
This decision represents in a nutshell the 
philosophy of the Alliance that defence 
capability and arms control are tasks of 
equal importance. Whoever says no to 
the two-track decision thereby opposes 
the common security policy of all NATO 
member States. 
On 18 and 19 November1983, prior to the Bundestag debate, a special SPD party conference was 
held in Cologne at which a large majority of the delegates voted against the deployment of new 
intermediate-range missles in West Germany and demanded a continuation of the arms policy 
talks in Geneva Only14 out of 400 delegates voted with Deputy Party Chairman Helmut Schmidt 
(left) for deployment and against the motion supported by Party Chairman Willy Brandt (right). 
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Whoever breaks the linkage between mi-
litary security and detente is also de-
stroying the political concept of the Alli-
ance without providing an alternative 
to it. 
Whoever pursues only the one or the 
other of the two elements of the Harmel 
Report according to his own needs will 
make his policy incalculable both to his 
friends in the Alliance and to the States of 
the Warsaw Pact. 
Whoever revokes the two-track decision 
and thereby breaks the linkage between 
defence and arms control is to all intents 
and purposes putting at risk the Alliance 
itself, its free will and its viability. 
In view of this situation, the Social Demo-
cratic Party of Germany has to answer 
the following questions before the Ger-
man and international public: 
- Why does it choose not to take heed of 
the Soviet arms accumulation and the 
threat resulting from it? 
- Why does it want to deny the Alliance 
the requisite military cover? 
- Why does it again and again embrace 
the arguments of the Soviet side, 
thereby isolating itself in the West as 
well as from the majority of its brother 
Socialist parties? 
- Why does it invariably impute to the 
United States a lack of willingness to 
negotiate in Geneva, regardless of the 
facts which indicate the contrary? 
- And why does it not acknowledge the 
endeavours of the Federal Govern-
ment to exhaust all negotiating ave-
nues? 
Professor Karl Kaiser, a prominent and 
internationally respected member of the 
Social Democratic Party, said on 2 Oc-
tober 1983 to the Seeheim branch ofthe 
SPD: 
"In the two-track decision the essence of 
the issue at stake is whether or not the 
Federal Republic of Germany, in agree-
ment with its allies, should dig in its heels 
against the incipient Soviet claim to he-
gemony over Western Europe. The So-
viet aim is a new political system in Eu-
rope, born of the erosion of Euro-Ameri-
can co-operation and increasing Euro-
pean dependence upon the Soviet 
Union. This is a vital issue of national inte-
rest, namely of the self-determination of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, in 
which Soviet positions must not be un-
questioningly adopted nor efforts direct-
ed againstthem be undermined internal-
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ly. This was recognized by the Social De-
mocratic Government under Helmut 
Schmidt. It therefore pursued the two-
track decision, which was approved by 
the party. 
However, in a process extending over 
several years, rejection grew stronger 
within the SPD and developed into a 
change of course. The party's position 
has, in effect, taken a 180-degree tum." 
I have nothing to add to that. 
Principles of Our 
Security Policy 
Let me enumerate the principles which 
govern the security policy ofthis Federal 
Government. 
1. We are part of the West. The Alliance 
for peace and freedom is a fundamen-
tal component of German policy. In it 
are combined our basic values, our 
way of life and our security. Only a 
capable and united Alliance can en-
sure peace in freedom. The Alliance 
serves peace in Europe and the 
world. It remains the basis of the poli-
cy of understanding with the East. 
The Federal Government stands firm-
ly by the security policy of the Alli-
ance. This policy combines deter-
rence and defence with arms control 
and disarmament. 
2. East and West are on trial as we stand 
poised at the crossroads leading ei-
ther to success in disarmament or to 
further accumulation of nuclear arms 
in view of the decision either to deploy 
new intermediate-range nuclear wea-
pons or to ban an entire category of 
nuclear weapons from this earth, or at 
least to limit them on an equal basis. 
Success will require that both sides 
pay due heed to their respective se-
curity requirements. 
3. The Federal Government stands firm-
ly by the NATO two-track decision. If 
the negotiations bring no immediate 
result the Alliance will make the first 
Pershing and cruise missiles operati-
onal by the end of the year. The Fed-
eral Republic of Germany will contri-
bute its share to this. We know that 
even once this has happened the 
United States of America will leave no 
stone untumed in the Geneva nego-
tiations in the search for a succesful 
outcome. 
4. Rrm support of the NATO decision is 
now synonymous with the survival of 
democratic Europe, the preservation 
of the Atlantic Alliance and the conti-
nuation of relations on an equal basis 
with the Soviet Union. 
5. The Federal Government is adhering 
to that unambiguous security policy 
which the German people needs. 
The pillars of our foreign policy re-
main the Atlantic Alliance and the Eu-
ropean Community. The decision in 
favour of the Atlantic Alliance, in fa-
vour of partnership with the United 
States and Canada, will continue to 
ensure peace and freedom for us. 
Therefore, whoever commits himself 
totally to peace, whoever regards 
freedom and human dignity as su-
preme values, whoever wishes to see 
our national interests ensured in the 
long term, must preserve the health 
and strength of the Western Alliance. 
The Atlantic Alliance, whose nucleus 
remains the deep-rooted friendship 
of the old States of this continent with 
the new world beyond the Atlantic, 
will ensure peace in Europe. 
I advocate that this path, which the 
CDU, CSU and FDP pursued under 
Konrad Adenauer, should not be de-
viated from. We are not wanderers 
between East and West. 
There is no middle road between demo-
cracy and dictatorship. We are on the 
side of freedom. Our freedom means free 
personal development for each indivi-
dual combined with responsibility for his 
neighbour. Since we have a duty to-
wards ourneigbourwe must not, particu-
larly as Christians, increase the danger 
of tyranny, and thereby of war, for our fel-
low human beings. 
Without freedom there can be no peace. 
Where the basic values of freedom and 
justice are abused, where human rights 
are infringed, peace is always in danger. 
Without freedom there is no peace wor-
thy of the name. A policy which ensures 
freedom will also bring peace. 
War must not be a means of pursuing po-
licies. This is a basic principle of demo-
cratic States. Any State which permits of 
no violence within its borders and forms 
the national will by the peaceful majority 
decision of its citizens will also avoid us-
ing force towards other States. 
But it is equally true in the struggle for ex-
ternal peace internal peace must not be 
endangered. 
I respect the expression of personal con-
victions in the peace debate. 
Preservation of 
Internal Peace 
However according to our democratic 
constitution the decision lies with the 
majority of the freely elected parliament. 
Particularly in matters which are termed 
survival issues there is not the slightest 
legitimation for the pretensions of a mi-
nority to impose its will upon a majority. 
No one has the right to resist democratic 
majority decisions of our freely elected 
representative body. 
That is the way of our free and peaceful 
democratic order. 
This order is worth preserving at home 
and defending abroad. We owe that to 
ourselves and our partners in the Alli-
ance. We also owe it to the people in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
Seldom has the will to resist hegemonic 
designs and to defend resolutely one's 
own freedom been so compellingly ex-
pressed as it was by Manes Sperber in 
the speech he gave on acceptance of 
the Peace Prize of the Gennan Book 
Trade: 
"Since I, like so many others, have al-
ways been inclined to criticize our civili-
zation with unrelenting harshness, I wish 
today to emphasize all the more loudly 
that in spite of everything Europe can be 
saved if it does not allow itself to be se-
duced into surrendering at the very time 
when the courage to stand up for hu-
manity and truth presupposes the cour-
age to enforce one's will." 
We are all called upon to do this. Since I 
bear responsibility for our fellow citizens 
I regard this as a very personal commit-
ment. 
As a Christian who also knows himselfto 
be bound in his high office by Christian 
ethics, I oppose attempts to bring the 
Sennon on the Mount into politics in a 
way which I, for one, find unacceptable. 
To live up to the Sennon on the Mount 
means to recognize in all humility that 
there is no God-like perfection here on 
earth. Confusion of the promise of para-
dise with earthly reality does no justice to 
the Sennon on the Mount. 
Christians know about the contradictory 
nature of man, which has left its mark in 
history and has time and again endan-
gered peace. This condition of human 
existence cannot be removed from us. 
Strong police forces had to be used against members of the peace movement to reinforce a .no-
entry Jaw" for demonstrators applying to a defined zone around the government quarter. 
If, by being Christians, we transcended 
human nature, we would no longer need 
politics. The Sermon on the Mount is no 
call to deny reality, but an obligation to 
act responsibly. 
The fact that war has been prevented in 
Europe for such a considerable time is 
the result of responsible action, an 
achievement of reason, indeed a work of 
statesmanship which must be conti-
nued and reinforced. 
This purpose is served by our defence 
preparedness, our efforts to achieve a 
balance of power and thereby to ensure 
peace and freedom. 
Whoever has to give in to the pressure of 
tyranny because he does not stand up to 
its power, goads it on to new acts of 
blackmail and to the use of force. No de-
mocratic politician must put himself in a 
position where he can no longer choose 
freely. We should not forget that bitter 
realization of British Prime Minister 
Chamberlain who, after signing the Mu-
nich agreement, described British pow-
erlessness in the face ofthe National So-
cialist regime to the House of Commons. 
He said, "Our experience has shown us 
only too clearly that weakness in anned 
strength means weakness in diploma-
cy." 
History teaches us that whoever is weak 
will encourage hegemonic claims and is 
actually challenging others to threaten 
him. He makes himself subject to black-
mail and puts at risk his freedom and 
thereby eventually peace too. Only the 
finn ness ofthefreeworld can show tota-
litarian States their limits. We must never 
play off peace and freedom against each 
other. 
Only a people which lives in peace and 
freedom can render a real contribution to 
peace in the world. 
We Gennans all want peace in freedom. 
We want peace with all nations. And 
above all want it with all our neighbours, 
in West and East. 
We are aware of the abhorrent things 
which took place in the name of Genna-
ny. We will never forget the unspeakable 
misery experienced by the nations of Eu-
rope and of other continents in two world 
wars. Our own people retain a vivid me-
mory of the wounds inflicted by despot-
ism and war. 
Innumerable Gennans experienced ter-
rible suffering at that time, within their fa-
milies or amongst their friends. We will 
never know exactly how many people 
lost their lives in the prisons of the Nazi 
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regime, in the battles of the war, in nightly 
bombings, as prisoners of war or while 
fleeing or being expelled from their na-
tive regions. 
Many oft hose who survived war and dic-
tatorship remained scarred by those 
dreadful experiences. 
We have learned the lesson of history. 
These experiences have engraved 
themselves deeply on the minds of our 
people. 
Weapons and military strength hold no 
fascination for us. We are not missile ad-
dicts. 
But in a world without peace we must be 
prepared to do all that is necessary to en-
sure our peace in freedom. We cannot 
step aside and hope from the historical 
sidelines that others will succeed in se-
curing peace and our freedom. 
We must also render our own contribu-
tion. 
"To serve the peace of the world" as is 
laid down in our constitution has been 
and remains for us a constant political 
imperative and moral obligation. But this 
peace in freedom has its price. We must 
be prepared to endure sacrifices for it. 
We must do our duty, each in his own 
place, all the citizens of our country, the 
freely elected parliamentary representa-
tives, the democratically legitimized 
Federal Government and I myself. Aware 
ofthe great and, indeed, heavy responsi-
bility which I bear in my office, I remain 
convinced of the following: 
Only by restoring the balance now and 
thereby re-endorsing our commitment 
to the Alliance will we secure peace in 
freedom for our country. 
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AFunda-
mental 
Decision 
on the 
Orientation 
of German 
Foreign and 
Security 
Policy 
Speech by Hans-Dietrich Gens-
cher, Federal Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, in the Bundestag Debate 
of 21 November1983 on the NATO 
Two-Track Decision and the State 
of the Geneva INF Talks 
-Excerpts-
In the past few days my thoughts have 
frequently wandered back to 14 Decem-
ber1979. Having just come back to Bonn 
from the meeting of NATO Foreign Minis-
ters, where the two-track decision was 
taken on 12 December, I made the fol-
lowing statement that day here in the 
Bundestag on behalf of the Federal Go-
vernment: 
, The United Kingdom, Italy and the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany have already 
agreed to deployment on their territory, 
to be effected in three to four years' 
time." 
On that occasion all parties represented 
in the Bundestag, the FOP, the SPD and 
the CDU/CSU, endorsed this decision. 
It was a decision that the Federal Go-
vernment did not take arbitrarily. it was a 
decision that had been prepared in nu-
merous deliberations of the Federal Se-
curity Council, the Federal Government, 
the committees of the Bundestag and 
several plenary meetings here. All parlia-
mentary parties were in full agreement 
that this was the right method of counter-
ing the enormous challenge posed by 
the ever-increasing Soviet arms build-
up. 
Today we must decide whether develop-
ments have occurred since 14 Decem-
ber 1979 justifying the abandonment of 
that decision. The NATO two-track deci-
sion stated for that purpose: ,NATO's re-
quirements will be examined in the light 
of concrete results reached through ne-
gotiations". Developments since then 
have shown that no such concrete re-
sults have been attained. They have si-
multaneously shown that the threat 
posed by Soviet INF has not diminished, 
but rather increased, and that Western 
restraint over four years, you could even 
describe it as a Western concession, did 
not serve as an incentive to reduce the 
existing threat, but was construed as an 
encouragement to continue with the 
arms build-up. Anyone who speaks now 
of further restraint offers further encou-
ragement. We cannot accept any res-
ponsibility for this. 
In reality, it is not a question oftoday hav-
ing to decide on the two-track decision 
of December 1979. We decided on this 
four years ago and since then this Alli-
ance decision has time and again been 
reaffirmed here in the Bundestag. Today 
our decision is whether or not we wish to 
abide by the decision already taken by 
the Alliance. However, it would be self-
deception to believe that this is the cru-
cial point. Let me set aside the signifi-
cance of this point for a moment. 
The History of the 
Two-Track Decision 
It is not a question of adhering to a deci-
sion suggested to us or possibly im-
posed on us by others. It is not a case of 
doing someone in Washington a favour 
by. agreeing to the deployment of West-
em missiles in Western Europe. The his-
tory of the two-track decision is comple-
tely different. The fact is that the Euro-
peans, and publicly the German Chan-
cellor at the time, were the first to point 
out the danger of the Soviet arms build-
up. This aroused anxiety that this build-
up could result in Western Europe being 
decoupled from the United States and 
hence prompted the Europeans to 
broach the question of Western modern-
ization. The implementation of the two-
track decision is not a favour Europe is 
granting to the United States, but a con-
tribution the United States is providing to 
European security. We will be able to 
maintain this contribution to European 
security in every conceivable form, and 
by this I do not just mean the deployment 
of INF, only if we Europeans are prepared 
to contribute our share to the collective 
security of the Western Alliance. Above 
all this implies that we here in Europe and 
here in the Federal Republic of Germany 
do not give cause for doubt as to our wil-
lingness to abide by our acknowledged 
responsibility and meet our assumed 
obligations. We have to decide whether 
we wish to stand by these decisions or 
whether we want to embark on a course 
terminating in a grave loss of trust, ulti-
mately in isolation, and hence in the for-
feiture of all security. Seen in this light, 
the decision to be taken here today and 
tomorrow is a fundamental decision on 
the orientation of German foreign and se-
curity policy. It is in reality a decision on 
which position the Federal Republic of 
Germany will take in the future, i.e. that of 
a reliable member of the West or of a 
country drifting out of the union of Wes-
tern democracies. 
As you know, our Western Allies abide by 
the two-track decision. The two other 
countries selected for the first phase of 
deployment, the United Kingdom and 
Italy, have voted with large parliamentary 
majorities in favour of the 1979 decision 
on deployment being put into effect be-
cause of the lack of a concrete agree-
ment, which they, like us, find regret-
table. It has rightly been pointed out that 
the majority of the European Parliament 
has also decided in this manner. 
From the very outset German foreign and 
security policy has striven to guarantee 
the firm integration of our country in the 
family of Western democracies, the Eu-
ropean community and the Western Alli-
ance, as well as the credible coupling of 
Europe's security interests with those of 
the United States. We would have to pay 
dearly for any decoupling or any deve-
lopment that might lead towards such 
decoupling. The price would be a weak-
ening of the Alliance and an erosion of 
our security. 
surely cannot be denied that our Allies in 
the West, not only the Americans, but 
also the French, the British and other Eu-
ropeans, are feeling increasing concern. 
Their concern at what is happening here 
is not, as in the past, concern over Ger-
man militarism. And it is certainly not the 
fear that the deployment of American 
missiles on German soil night increase 
the risk of war in Europe. They are con-
cerned about a new kind of unpredic-
table German neutralism. We must coun-
ter this concern in order to preserve sta-
bility in Europe. Their concern is that we 
Germans might, in a state of somnabul-
ance, proceed to withdraw from the Wes-
tern community, captivated by the illu-
Modernization of INF: When and Where? 
Planned deployment 1983-1987 
Molesworth 
64 cruise 
missiles 
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Forennes 
(Belgium) 
48 cruise 
missiles 
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If the Federal Republic of Germany, ifthe 
Bundestag were to decide tomorrow 
against deployment, against the NATO 
two-track decision, then this Alliance 
would no longer be what it has always 
been. On no account would it any longer 
be a guarantor of freedom and security 
here in Europe. This is the issue at stake. 
We, in particular, cannot take any secur-
ity risks. We know that all efforts for ac-
commodation, co-operation and detente 
require the reliable foundation of our in-
tegration in the Western Alliance. It 
would be illusory to believe that one 
could refrain from supporting the neces-
sary decisions of the Alliance and still be 
successful in the progressive develop-
ment of co-operation with the East. Se-
curity cannot be obtained free of charge. 
It is now for us to reaffirm the fundamen-
tal elements of our policy. This is a task 
that points and extends far beyond the 
significance of the two-track decision. It 
sion that we can best solve our national 
problems through neutralism. 
Our Special Responsibility 
Our Allies are concerned about this be-
cause they realize how important the 
Federal Republic of Germany is for joint 
Western security. Throughout their his-
tory, our people have borne a special re-
sponsibility by dint of their geographical 
position at the heart of Europe. We can-
not claim that we have always properly 
discharged this responsibility. On the 
contrary, we have caused grave upheav-
als in Europe. But the task we had was 
not easy. We have often been at logger-
heads with our neighbours. Today we 
are in harmony with them. Today we have 
linked our national fate to the destiny of 
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Europe. If we again evade this responsi-
bility by seeking to go it alone, then a 
great deal of the stability in Europe to 
which we all contributed together after 
the Second World War will be lost. 
If our country were to drift out of the 
Western Alliance, initially not on the ba-
sis of restated positions, but only 
through its conduct, this would lead to 
serious destabilization. This time it would 
not be Germany's strength that poses 
problems for Europe, it would be the 
weakness of the Federal Republic of 
Germany that would create hazards for 
Europe. A weak Federal Republic of Ger-
many outside the framework of the Wes-
tern Alliance would produce a vacuum of 
power around us and become the victim 
of rivalry. This must not happen. Conse-
quently, the fulfilment of our responsibili-
ties in the Alliance, which were not im-
posed on us, but which we accepted be-
cause we perceived them as right, cons-
titutes our contribution to peace in Eu-
rope. No question must be left open, inc-
luding the question of the attitude of all 
responsible political forces towards the 
Western Alliance. 
Whenever the implementation of deci-
sions taken by the Western Alliance is in-
volved, it is essential that we perceive our 
responsibility. In the debate on peace 
and freedom for the Western democra-
cies we are not merely passive onlook-
ers in the confrontation between the two 
superpowers. Whoever believes this and 
seeks, by word and deed, a position 
equidistant from the two superpowers is 
calling fundamental German interests 
into question. After all, it was not by 
chance or historical coincidence that we 
became a member of the Western Alli-
ance. It was a deliberate decision.lt was 
a decision in favour of peace and free-
dom. We are ourselves a party to East-
West confrontation. 
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When we ask ourselves what develop-
ments have occurred since 14 Decem-
ber1979, the date on which the Bundes-
tag endorsed the Federal Government's 
positive vote, we have to note that the 
number of Soviet SS-20 missiles was 
much lower than today. This figure has 
been multiplied as a result of a constant 
build-up by the Soviet Union. 
The reasons that prompted the NATO 
two-track decision then have not be-
come any less significant. Wrth each new 
SS-20 missile they have gained further 
significance. Whoever voted in favour of 
the two-track decision then cannot vote 
against it today when the threat is even 
greater, but must instead state that the 
decision taken then was a right and ne-
cessary response, one that cannot be 
called into question today. 
Nor must we forget that developments 
have occurred that were marked by the 
use of force, for instance in Afghanistan. 
Here in the West we have nonetheless 
undertaken every effort to make the talks 
in Geneva a success. Did we not regard it 
as a joint achievement that, through the 
firmness of all parties in the Bundestag, it 
proved possible to convince the Soviet 
Union of the need to start negotiations, 
and indeed to do so only a few months af-
ter Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had 
insisted in Bonn that there would be no 
negotiations? 
German Renunciation of 
Nuclear Weapons 
We must now draw our conclusions from 
the absence of the tangible agreement 
we desired. The period since the two-
track decision has been used by the 
West to make concrete proposals, pro-
posals that have taken into particular ac-
count the fundamental interests of our 
country.· 
It was surely not an illusionary and unrea-
listic demand of detente when the United 
States proposed, at our request, the ze-
ro-zero option, in other words renuncia-
tion by the Soviet Union of its INF build-
up and renunciation by the West of INF 
modernization. Could there indeed be a 
better result for our divided nation than 
complete mutual renunciation of inter-
mediate-range missiles. 
The Federal Republic of Germany is one 
of the countries that have renounced 
ownership of nuclear weapons. This re-
nunciation of nuclear weapons entitles 
us to demand not to be threatened with 
nuclear weapons. This is our right and we 
must lay claim to it. When we renounced 
possession of nuclear weapons, we did 
so in the expectation that our territory 
would not be threatened by the nuclear 
weapons of another nuclear power. We 
continue to assert this claim. This claim 
means that we continue to regard Soviet 
renunciation of all ground-launched mis-
siles not only as the best solution for our 
people, for Western Europe, for all Euro-
pean nations, but also as a logical conse-
quence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. But on that occasion we were 
also granted, without objection, the right 
to assure ourselves, in the event of being 
threatened with nuclear weapons, of 
protection with nuclear weapons by an 
allied and friendly power. This is what led 
to the second part of the NATO two-track 
decision, namely the right to and, in the 
event of the other side not withdrawing 
its threat, the obligation to carry out mo-
dernization. We shall continue this poli-
cy, which is marked by a readiness tone-
gotiate and the resolve to take the ne-
cessary steps for our security. When it 
became clear that the Soviet Union was 
not prepared to forego its arms build-up, 
altogether, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, for its part, broughtthe proposal of 
an interim agreement into the discus-
sion, since we felt that it would be better 
to reduce the Soviet build-up in part, and 
hence scale down Western moderniza-
tion, than to leave things as they were. 
We did not make our discussions in the 
Alliance and with the United States a 
public debate, but rather an intensive 
dialogue. What mattered to us was to ob-
tain an effective Western negotiating po-
sition and not to artificially provoke diffe-
rences with the Americans. 
In the further course of these discus-
sions we also helped to ensure that the 
proposal was filled out with details, that it 
was made clear that the West is pre-
pared to acknowledge the security inte-
rests of the East and that, with mutual 
global ceilings, we do not intend to meet 
all the modernization requirements in 
Western Europe. This is, incidentally, an 
element taken from the "walk-in-the-
woods proposal" which is not being 
mentioned in public at present. When 
doubts arose as to whether the West is 
prepared, in the event of reduced mo-
dernization in response to a reduced So-
viet build-up, to deploy fewer Pershing II 
missiles as well, or whether Western re-
ductions would only extend to cruise 
missiles, it was made clear at the bar-
gaining table that the reductions will of 
course apply proportionately to both 
systems, to Pershing lis and cruise mis-
siles alike. On this point the Western ne-
gotiating position was presented in an in-
creas ingly differentiated manner. 
One thing was clear from the outset: 
equal global ceilings on both sides, as 
stated in the NATO two-track decision, 
and rejection of a Soviet monopoly on 
ground-launched INF. This needs to be 
stated quite unequivocally. We will not 
accept a Soviet monopoly on ground-
launched INF directed against Western 
Europe or other parts of the world. Such 
a monopoly would make it possible to 
use threat as a political instrument, whe-
never deemed necessary. 
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Nobody here will accuse the Soviet lead-
ers of wanting to attack a peaceful Wes-
tern Europe with their intermediate-
range missiles, but the existence of 
these weapons, the possibility of using 
these weapons as a form of threat would 
impair the freedom of political choice of 
Western Europe and decouple us from 
the United States. It would be the begin-
ning of a process of political strangula-
tion of Western Europe. We must notal-
low this process to be set in motion. 
The French and British 
Systems 
We must therefore abide by the decision 
that received the backing of the parties 
represented in the Bundestag on 14 De-
cember 1979. This cannot be altered in 
any way by the demand made at a later 
stage that French and British systems be 
included or taken into account in the 
talks. The question as to whether these 
systems should be taken into account is 
not new. We examined it when preparing 
the NATO decision and rejected it for 
good reasons. In 1980, at our talks in 
Moscow, the Soviet leaders still voiced 
the opinion that they regarded these 
French and British systems as strategic 
and that they did not therefore consider 
it right to include them in the INF talks. 
Nobody in France or Britain holds the 
view that there cannot be any negotia-
tions in which these systems are taken 
account of. During the current session of 
the United Nations General Assembly 
the French President and the British Fo-
reign Secretary made it quite clear that, if 
certain preconditions are met, they are 
indeed prepared to have their systems 
included in international talks. This is the 
path to follow. Today we should not, in 
addition to the problems that we un-
doubtedly face in East-West relations, 
drive a deep wedge between our country 
and these two important European allies 
by altering our position on the French 
and British systems. 
It is essential that in this matter, too, we 
do not increase the concerns of our 
friends that we Germans might be trying 
to shun our obligations and responsibili-
ties. In actual fact, these systems are, by 
their very nature and purpose, not in-
tended or even suitable for guaranteeing 
the security of the Federal Republic of 
Germany or of other non-nuclear Wes-
tern European countries. It is even ques-
tionable whether they suffice to guaran-
tee the security of the two countries 
owning them. This is why these two 
countries belong to the Alliance. Let us 
therefore not jeopardize with this new 
demand the confidence of our European 
allies in the steadfastness of our policies. 
The question now is how to continue 
along the path embarked upon by the 
The Bundestag debate following the goverment policy statement of 22 November1983 focused on the Pershing II missile, which is to be deployed 
exclusively on West German territory. Left photo: Successful test of a Pershing II missile at Cape Canaveral. Right photo: American military trucks 
at U.S. air base near Mutlangen in southwestern Germany, where a part of the new Pershing systems are to be deployed. 
13 
Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Western Alliance. Many people in this 
country and throughout the world are 
concerned about how the negotiations 
are to continue. For four years after the 
NATO two-track decision we, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Western 
States, declared and demonstrated our 
readiness to carry on negotiating de-
spite the continuing Soviet build-up. 
This attitude entitles us, and by ,us" I 
mean the governments of these coun-
tries, our peoples, all the peoples of Eu-
rope, to expect the Soviet Union likewise 
to display a readiness to continue the ne-
gotiations in order to reach an agree-
ment. Such negotiations at the present 
or another conference table are just as 
much in the interest of the Soviet Union 
and its allies as in our own interest. We 
will not leave the negotiating table. We 
will sit down at any negotiating table set 
up elsewhere. We will do the utmost to 
work towards a concrete agreement dur-
ing the process of deployment, which we 
are about to initiate. 
Nothing Is Irreversible 
The declaration of the Western Alliance 
remains valid. Each individual American 
intermediate-range missile now de-
ployed can be removed again as a result 
of a negotiated agreement. Nothing is ir-
reversible. We shall make every effort to 
ensure that the negotiations lead to such 
an agreement. 
We will achieve this if we give effect to all 
aspects of our policy, the NATO two-
track decision and the other elements of 
our peace policy. These other elements 
of our peace policy extend beyond the 
NATO decision, but are inconceivable 
withoutthis part ofourforeign and secur-
ity policy. 
The question of the strategy pursued by 
the Western Alliance coincides with the 
question of the suitability, reliability and 
perspectives of the Western strategy of 
deterrence. When we speak of deter-
rence, we must ask ourselves: deter-
rence against what? The answer is deter-
rence against war, I. e. ensuring that war 
can no longer be conducted in Europe. 
This strategy is a war-prevention strate-
gy. That is why we support it. 
We must never forget that even a con-
ventional war in Europe, I. e. without the 
use of nuclear weapons, would be a 
thousand times more horrifying than the 
Second World War, of which we all have 
such bitter memories. We musttherefore 
make every effort to prevent every form 
of war. This is our strategy. 
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Yet we know that a strategy of deter-
rence cannot be the definitive response 
to the question of how to secure lasting 
peace throughout Europe. But it will have 
to remain the response until we have 
created the political conditions in which 
the absence of war ensured through de-
terrence can be superseded by a peace-
ful order founded on mutual trust. This is 
the task of our policy for peace. This is a 
task that we must fulfil not only at the INF 
talks. Indeed, it is dangerous to reduce 
the question of safeguarding peace, the 
question of East-West relations, to a 
single issue. 
We must comply with this task. We must 
fulfil it at the Geneva disarmament talks, 
in the United Nations Committee on Dis-
armament and at the talks on force re-
ductions in Central Europe. We must fulfil 
this task at the Conference on Disarma-
ment in EuropeduetostartnextJanuary, 
during the first phase of which the main 
aim is to build up confidence in the whole 
of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals 
and then, departing from this basis of 
confidence, to work towards a balance of 
conventional forces throughout Europe. 
We want to attain a conventional balance 
lnthewholeofEuropebymeansofdisar-
mament. This means that the Soviet 
Union will have to be willing to reduce its 
conventional superiority. 
We will systematically continue on this 
path of circumspect and realistic peace 
policy together with our allies. Through 
co-operation with the GDR, and through 
participation in international confe-
rences we will do our utmost to ensure 
the necessary political conditions for the 
establishment of an order in Europe that 
can justifiably and deservedly be called a 
peace order. 
In this context we must bear in mind that, 
located as we are at the heart of Europe, 
we have a special responsibility in at-
taining this goal. 
We discharge this responsibility by pur-
suing a calculable foreign policy, by en-
suring that this policy accords with the 
views and jointly developed goals of the 
peace policies of all our neighbours and 
allies in the West, and by our sincere will 
to proceed with the governments and 
peoples of the East along the path lead-
ing, through reduction oftensions, confi-
dence-building and disarmament, to 
precisely this peaceful order. 
We know what repercussions each of 
our decisions have on relations between 
the two German States and we will ask 
ourselves this question whenever we 
take a decision. This is why we attach 
such importance to the task of shaping 
these relations. 
As a government, as a parliament and as 
a people in a State representing only part 
of our nation, it is our task to make every 
effort to preserve the interests of our 
other countrymen, just as it is our task as 
Europeans to preserve the interests of 
other Europeans. As we understand it, 
this responsibility implies that we pre-
serve peace for all of us in East and West 
alike. It also implies, in our view, the re-
cognition that we cannot safeguard 
peace for others by placing our own free-
dom at stake. 
Resolution of the German Bundestag of 22 November 1983 
Implementation of both parts of the 
NATO two-track decision of 12 Decem-
ber1979 
I. The German Bundestag reaffirms its 
resolution of 26 May 1981 to support ,the 
Federal Government in the consistent 
and timely implementation of both parts 
of the NATO decision of 12 December 
1979". 
II. The German Bundestag and all the cit-
izens of our country share the wish to 
preserve and strengthen peace and 
freedom and to obtain marked arms re-
ductions without imperilling our security. 
The Federal Republic of Germany's 
membership of and participation in the 
NATO defence alliance serve this goal. 
For over three decades now this Alliance 
has successfully contributed towards 
preserving peace and freedom and will 
continue to do so. The Alliance does not 
threaten anyone.ln the Bonn declaration The vote on the resolution regarding INF deployment introduced by the governing parties. Bun-
of 10 June 1982 it was stated: ,None of destag President Rainer Barzel (CDU) is shown at the ballot box. 
our weapons will ever be used except in 
response to attack". The Alliance sate-
guards peace through a policy of military 
equilibrium at the lowest possible level. It 
strives for a reduction of East-West ten-
sions through a policy of accommoda-
tion with the East. 
The German Bundestag stresses that 
understanding and accommodation 
with the Soviet Union and the other 
countries of the Warsaw Pact can only be 
accomplished on the basis of equal poli-
tical rights and the recognition of equal 
security for all States. With its deploy-
ment of SS-20 missiles the Soviet Union 
has changed the security situation and 
is thus threatening the freedom of politi-
cal choice of the countries of Western 
Europe. The NATO two-track decision is 
designed to avert this threat. 
The German Bundestag regrets that the 
Geneva talks on intermediate-range 
nuclear forces (IN F) have not yet led to an 
agreement, despite the great efforts 
made by the united States and its allies. 
In order to ensure Western Europe's mi-
litary security and freedom of political 
choice we therefore need, in conformity 
with the NATO two-track decision, a 
counterbalance to the Soviet SS-20 mis-
siles threatening us. 
The German Bundestag therefore sup-
ports the decision ofthe German Federal 
Government to initiate the process of de-
ployment on schedule in accordance 
with its obligation deriving from the se-
cond part of the NATO decision. 
The German Bundestag recalls that the 
Alliance, despite a vast Soviet build-up of 
modem INF, forewent any arms moderni-
zation for four years and made earnest 
efforts to obtain negotiations and an 
agreement acceptable to both sides. 
The German Bundestag welcomes the 
declared readiness of the United States 
to continue the INF talks irrespective of 
the commencement of deployment. The 
aim continues to be to reduce drastical-
ly, if not scrap completely, long-range, 
ground-launched INF in Europe. This 
can only be achieved through negotia-
tions. Such negotiations remain expe-
dient in any event. The process of de-
ployment will extend over several years. 
Through negotiations a limitation of in-
termediate-range missiles and the re-
moval of missiles already deployed can 
still be attained in the future. 
The German Bundestag calls upon the 
Soviet Union, in its own interest, not to 
prevent a continuation of the INF talks 
through unilateral action. It appeals to 
the Soviet Union to abandon its claim to a 
monopoly on ground-launched INF and 
hence clear the way for an equitable 
agreement. 
The German Bundestag urges that the 
East-West dialogue be continued and 
deepened in all spheres and at all levels 
in order to create, through confidence-
building and co-operation, a climate in 
which tensions can be defused and 
where equitable and verifiable agree-
ments on disarmament can be achieved. 
(This resolution was introduced 
by the governing CDU/CSU and 
FOP coalition. It was adopted with 
a vote of 286 for, 225 against and 1 
abstained.) 
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Future 
of Detente 
in Europe 
Federal Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher on 
2 December 1983 
(excerpts) 
The deployment of new American inter-
mediate-range missiles, which deprives 
the Soviet Union of the possibility of ob-
taining, with its build-up of SS-20 mis-
siles, an instrument for political domin-
ance in Europe orfordecoupling Europe 
from the United States, represents a 
turning point in the development of Euro-
pean security and of East-West relations 
in Europe. 
Implementation of both parts of the two-
track decision in the face of great internal 
and external strains confirms the We-
stem Alliance's ability to act. 
- The Alliance has moved closer togeth-
er as a result of the consultations, 
which permitted the United States'Eu-
ropean Allies to participate to an un-
precedented extent in the develop-
ment of negotiating positions. 
- France is a firm pillar of Alliance policy, 
including the two-track decision.lt has 
moved closer to the Federal Republic 
of Germany in the field of security poli-
cy. 
- The Soviet concept of "military deten-
te", which suggests to the Europeans 
that they should regard their security 
as being ensured primarily through 
detente without their undertaking ade-
quate defence efforts of their own, 
constitutes a dangerous alternative to 
a realistic policy of detente and has not 
gained acceptance. 
- Among the Soviet Union's neighbours 
in Western Europe and the Far East a 
common awareness of the Soviet 
threat has evolved and hence a com-
mon awareness of security. 
All of these considerations must not, 
especially in this nuclear age, give rise to 
complacency or even swaggering. In-
stead, they are the basis of an obligation 
for responsible action with due regard for 
everyone's interests. 
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Owing to the changed conditions now 
prevailing, the Soviet Union will reassess 
its situation and draw conclusions for its 
future policy towards the West. We, too, 
must ponder what the consequences of 
this new situation are for th.e future of 
East-West relations. 
Now that the missile debate is over, the 
East-West relationship in its entire 
breadth must again come to the fore. 
Western Governments will demonstrate 
that, contrary to the assertions of many 
critics of the new INF deployment, the 
missiles will not be an instrument of a 
,new policy of strength" and are not in-
tended to be an instrument to be used in 
a strategy of confrontation with the So-
viet Union on European soil, but that we 
adhere to detente and co-operation. 
Western Europe is becoming more se-
cure against the Soviet threat without 
the Soviet Union's security being im-
paired. 
The deployment of new American inter-
mediate-range systems in our country 
that are able to reach the Soviet Union, 
just as the Soviet SS-20s have long been 
able to reach us, reinforces our respon-
sibility and our policy in the Alliance of 
working towards moderation and under-
standing between East and West. 
Time Ripe for a New Attempt 
The West will not accept Soviet superio-
rity, nor will it hope for the collapse ofthe 
Soviet Union. Conversely, the Soviet 
Union will have to acknowledge that its 
hopes of Western Europe being decou-
pled from the United States will not be 
fulfilled. Both sides, East and West alike, 
can only gain if, bearing in mind the mani-
fold ties and experiences of their 
shared past, they devote their attention 
to opportunities for co-operation in a 
common future. 
The time is ripe for a new attempt at brin-
ging about a comprehensive, long-term 
and viable form of detente with the Soviet 
Union, based on equilibrium and equal 
rights. In this attempt, account should be 
taken of the experience gained in the 
1970s, when the efforts for detente pro-
duced considerable results, at least in 
Europe, but no lasting, overall form of de-
tente. 
In the 1970s the Soviet Union obtained 
from the United States recognition as a 
world power. However, in the text of the 
Basic Principles of Mutual Relations be-
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union of 29 May 1972, the Soviet Union 
pledged to exercise restraint, to refrain 
from efforts to obtain unilateral advan-
tage at the expense of the United States 
and to recognize the latter's security in-
terests. The restraint practised by the 
American Government in arms policy 
and in the Third World after Viet Nam and 
Watergate was wrongly regarded by the 
Soviet Union as a sign of weakness. It 
wrongly concluded that it could aban-
don the principle of restraint without jeo-
pardizing the superpower relationship 
established in 1972. Soviet advances in 
the Third World must be seen in this con-
text. Above all, the Soviet Union appa-
rently believed that it could exploit its 
strategic parity with the United States to 
build up an SS-20 missile potential in Eu-
rope and thus gain military superiority 
that would enable it, in the long term, to 
exert political influence and bring about 
a strategic decoupling. 
Thus, detente policy in the seventies was 
only a partial success. The treaties con-
cluded in Europe and the co-operation in 
many fields that evolved on this basis 
yielded benefits for both sides. The ar-
rangements relating to Bertin and the fur-
ther strengthening of the United States' 
role in Europe by means of the Quadri-
partite Agreement and the CSCE Rnal 
Act served to meet the essential security 
needs of the West. In the treaties it con-
cluded with the Eastthe Federal Republ-
ic of Germany rendered a contribution to 
stability in Europe that takes Soviet se-
curity needs into account. The Helsinki 
process combined human concerns 
with detente and economic exchange. 
Above all it promoted co-operation as an 
element of stability. 
In other words, the path of detente was 
embarked upon in Europe; and the be-
nefits continue to be felt. However, de-
tente was impaired by the adverse ef-
fects which the Soviet Union's arms ef-
forts and policy of decoupling had on the 
vital security interests of Western Euro-
pe. The Soviet Union must recognize that 
detente can be achieved in the long 
term only if both sides have the same 
goal, and not if one side views detente as 
a device for gaining security advantages 
over the other. 
The Kremlin Will Have 
to Decide 
The Soviet leaders will now consider the 
question as to which option is best suit-
ed for the realization of their own long-
term interests: 
- a return to increased confrontation, 
since detente has not allowed realiza-
tion of their aspirations to dominance, 
and is not likely to do so in the future, 
- continuation of a selective policy of de-
tente in those sectors that are particu-
larly worthwhile for the Soviet Union, 
especially economic co-coperation, 
- or a commitment to comprehensive 
co-operation on equal terms and on a 
long-term basis ... 
The Soviet Union ought to realize that a 
policy of ever closer co-operation does 
greater justice to its own security inter-
ests than a hegemonic system estab-
lished at the expense of its nei~hbours. 
Despite serious strains, the Soviet Union 
must of necessity have a crucial interest 
in constructive relations with the United 
States. A modicum of stability and con-
stancy in the superpower relationship is 
an essential prerequisite for the devel-
opment of stable East-West relations in 
Europe. A wider-ranging system of de-
tente is hardly conceivable without regu-
lated and improved American-Soviet re-
lations. 
Objectively speaking, the United States 
and the Soviet Union have essential, 
shared interests: the prevention of ar-
med conflicts that might lead to nuclear 
escalation, the attainment oftangible re-
sults in disarmament talks, as well as mu-
tually beneficial economic and agricultu-
ral co-operation. 
There must be a restrengthening of poli-
tical dialogue. The Soviet Union's princi-
pal interest consists in regaining Ameri-
can recognition of its status as an equal 
superpower, recognition which Mos-
cow, no doubt wrongly, believes it has 
lost. In this context, the leaders in Mos-
cow will have to ponder the link, estab-
lished in the Nixon-Breshnev communi-
que accompanying the signing of SALT I 
in 1972, between recognition of super-
power parity and a commitment to res-
traint and moderation. By pursuing a 
prudent policy of moderation, the Soviet 
Union is able to influence the United Sta-
tes' attitude. This applies to the disarma-
ment talks, regional conflicts and human 
rights issues. 
Prospect of Political 
Unification 
A close examination of its own interests 
should leave the Soviet Union in no 
doubt about the advantages of placing 
its relations with the West on a broader, 
more stable and long-term foundation. 
The Soviet Union's decision on this mat-
- the question of the future unity of the 
West- in the countries of deployment, 
among the Europeans, and between 
the Europeans and the Americans, as 
well as 
- the expected long-term course of the 
Western Alliance as a whole towards 
the Soviet Union in view of the new se-
curity situation in Europe. 
These questions have both short-term 
and long-term implications. 
In this situation the following tasks are of 
paramount importance for us: 
We must make every effort in the Federal 
Republic of Germany to restore consen-
sus as far as possible on the country's 
foreign policy, in Europe to bring the pro-
spect of political unification to the fore 
again, and in the Alliance to strengthen 
the political dimension, above all 
through increased transatlantic co-ope-
ration ... 
Our partners in the European Communi-
ty should also see our commitment to 
Europe in this historical perspective, but 
at the same time be aware of their own 
responsibility for Europe. 
Working Consistently 
Towards Political Union 
Anyone here who complains of a lack of 
European influence on the Alliance must 
commit himself to stengthening Eu-
rope's voice by resolutely promoting Eu-
ropean unification. We must work con-
sistently towards political union. But no 
strengthening of the role of Europe 
should be directed against the United 
States or even used as a means of un-
coupling Europe from America. This 
would doubly undermine the gains in 
terms of stability and security promised 
by European unification. The Soviet 
Union will have to think hard about its 
longer-term attitude to the increasingly 
cohesive European Community. In this 
respect Moscow must be left in no doubt 
that the Community will remain in ex-
tremely close partnership with the Unit-
ed States on the basis of shared values 
and in the interests of equilibrium in Eu-
rope ... 
The Europeans have found regular infor-
mal meetings of the "Gymnich type" to 
be beneficial, i.e., meetings at which For-
eign Ministers conduct a personal ex-
change of views on political questions 
and developments without staffs or 
press statements. Why should the Allies 
not formally adopt this model? I consider 
a meeting ofthis kind urgently necessary 
at the beginning of 1984. One important 
topic of such meetings must be the de-
velopment of East-West relations in a· 
longer-term perspective. To this end 
greater conceptual clarity is necessary. 
It is equally important that the Alliance 
strategy be shared by all NATO members 
and not put at stake whenever there is a 
change of government. Longer-term 
strategic perspectives, including those 
which concern outer space, are topics 
ter will be essentially determined by two u.s. Secretary of State George Shultz and Foreign MinisterGenscher held a meeting in Bonn on 
questions: 6 December 1983. They continued their exchange of views in a meeting with Chancellor Kohl. 
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which affect the common security inter-
ests of all who believe in the unity of the 
Alliance area. 
Detente and Co-operation 
with the East 
We in the Alliance must signal to the East 
that our wish for detente and co-opera-
tion is just as genuine as the wish to gua-
rantee our security. The balanced con-
cept expressed in the 1967 Harmel Re-
port, i.e. military security and detente, 
should be expressly reaffirmed. To this 
end, popular consensus on security poli-
cy must continuously be sought and at-
tained in all member States. Strengthen-
ing our own security, after all, creates 
precisely that firm foundation which will 
enable us to offer the Soviet Union long-
term co-operation in all spheres on the 
basis of balance, equality and mutual ad-
vantage. The Soviet leadership must rea-
lize now more than ever that, although 
the option of a weak and docile West has 
been denied them, we are offering the 
option of honest, fair and long-term co-
operation, which is consistent both with 
Soviet security interests, on the one 
hand, and the advancement of the pro-
sperity of the peoples within the Soviet 
Union and their economic stability, on 
the other. Anyone dealing with the Soviet 
Union must be fully aware that it will only 
alter its policy in the direction of greater 
restraint if such a change promises 
greater benefits or fewer losses. It would 
be a mistake to believe that the threat of 
losses could achieve more than prof-
fered benefits ... 
The negotiations on arms control and 
disarmament will have a critical bearing 
on East-West relations. An unequivocal 
commitment to Western security policy 
should be combined with new initiatives 
for the disarmament negotiations. The 
Soviet Union is called upon to resume 
negotiations on intermediate-range sys-
tems. The MBFR negotiations in Vienna 
should be given fresh impetus. The con-
ference on Confidence and Security-
building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe, to be held in Stockholm, should, 
from the very beginning, be used to ex-
plore all avenues to progress in East-
West relations, including political pro-
gress. It is consistent with this goal that 
the Foreign Ministers should open the 
Conference. Economic co-operation 
within the framework of our security in-
terests is an integral part of our policy of 
detente, just as arms control is an inte-
gral component of our security policy. 
It is in the interest of all of us that crises in 
peripheral theatres should not further 
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hamper the difficult task of fostering 
peace in Europe. Both major powers are 
called upon to conduct a dialogue. Mos-
cow must consider whether readiness to 
contribute to the political settlement of 
regional crises, instead of probing weak 
spots, is not a better way to obtain recog-
nition as a responsible and equal world 
power. The West must concentrate even 
more on the social and economic roots 
of regional crises and not only on the ri-
valry between foreign powers which let 
themselves be drawn into such conflicts. 
It is no coincidence that the security 
debate has again turned towards the 
more distantMure. For each side it is im-
portant to know how the other side ima-
gines a Mure peace order in Europe. 
Three questions will play an important 
role in this regard: 
- the security question in the narrower 
sense, particularly nuclear confronta-
tion, 
- the question of Germany, 
- the fate of Eastern Europe. 
Europeanization of the 
Gennan Question 
It is certainly not possible today to identi-
fy conclusively the elements of a just and 
lasting peace order in Europe. In Helsinki 
on 2 November19831 described in detail 
elements of a European peace order in 
which people could live free of fear and 
nations free of interference and tutelage. 
There is no doubt that progress towards 
such a peace order can only be achieved 
if balance is ensured and all hegemonic 
designs are eliminated. Confidence-
building in the widest sense and in its 
constantly evolving variations will be an 
important factor. Based on balance and 
linked to confidence-building, the defini-
tion and joint endorsement of the prin-
ciple of renunciation of force in word and 
deed can serve a valuable purpose. 
Conversely, those ideas which osten-
sibly create new security, but in fact be-
nefit those who already have the upper 
hand, such as nuclear-free zones in Eu-
rope or selective renunciation ofthe use 
of weapons, are obstructive. A policy 
aimed at peace demands that the use of 
all weapons, nuclear and conventional, 
be renounced. A policy for peace pre-
cludes varying degrees of security. 
In the German question the crux of the 
matter is to expedite the development of 
what is possible today and at the same 
time to remain aware of the European 
perspective of the German question. 
That means that the German question 
should not revert to being a national 
question, but should be a European one, 
keeping our national interests in concert 
with European interests. The belief of 
Germans in West and East in their joint 
responsibility for stability and peace in 
Europe is an important basis which pro-
vides the efforts to develop relations with 
the special attribute of a European policy 
for peace. 
The German Democratic Republic is our 
partner in the co-operation which we be-
lieve will, in the long term, lead to over-
coming the rift which cuts through Eu-
rope. History will show which philosphy 
will one day win over the other German 
State. The German Democratic Republic 
says it will be a socialist philosophy (no 
doubt meaning communist) while we are 
convinced that it will be the philosphy of 
freedom. However, this difference of opi-
nion should not hinder intergovernmen-
tal co-operation on the agreed basis, a 
wish endorsed by statements from the 
German Democratic Republic. 
The CSCE process is the framework in 
which changes will take place in Central 
and Eastern Europe which we consider 
desirable and important and at the same 
time it is the driving force behind them. 
The special characteristic of the CSCE 
process is that it promotes a climate of 
rapprochement, so that where stagna-
tion has hitherto reigned the need for re-
newal and change is becoming visible. 
For this reason, too, we should regard 
each individual member of the Warsaw 
Pact as an individual partner for talks and 
negotiations. This calls for respect of the 
national dignity of the other country, its 
cultural and scientific achievements and 
its contributions to progress in the world. 
We want consistent and intensive dialo-
gue and the broadest possible co-ope-
ration with the Soviet Union and all mem-
ber States of the Warsaw Pact in aware-
ness of our common history and com-
mon fate. A peaceful order in Europe 
cannot be established without dialogue 
and co-operation. An important role in 
this falls to the proces of reconciliation 
with Poland. We therefore remain anxi-
ous to develop German-Polish relations. 
It is importantto pursue discussion of the 
establishment of a peaceful order in Eu-
rope with far-sightednes and political 
imagination, but without forgetting that 
the long journey to this goal can only be 
mastered if it is begun in the right man-
ner. 
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The NATO 
Two-Tmck 
Decision 
1. At a special meeting of Foreign and 
Def~nce Ministres in Brussels on 12 De-
cember 1979: 
2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 
Summit where governments expressed 
the political resolve to meet the chal-
lenges to their security posed by the 
continuing momentum of the Warsaw 
Pact military build-up. 
3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years 
developed a large and growing capabil-
ity in nuclear systems that directly 
threaten Western Europe and have a 
strategic significance for the Alliance in 
Europe. This situation has been espe-
cially aggravated over the last few years 
by Soviet decisions to implement pro-
grammes modernizing and expanding 
their long-range nuclear capability sub-
stantially. In particular, they have de-
ployed the SS-20 missile, which offers 
Communique of the Special Meeting of 
Foreign and Defence Ministers in 
Brussels on 12 December 1979 
significant improvements over previous 
systems in providing greater accuracy, 
more mobility, and greater range, as well 
as having multiple warheads, and the 
Backfire bomber, which has a much bet-
ter peformance than other Soviet aircraft 
deployed hitherto in a theatre role. Dur-
Ing this period, while the Soviet Union 
has been reinforcing its superiority in 
Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces 
(LRTNF) both quantitatively and qualita-
tively, Western LRTNF capabilities have 
remained static. Indeed these forces are 
increasing in age and vulnerability and 
do not include land-based, long-range 
theatre nuclear missile systems. 
4. At the same time, the Soviets have 
also undertaken a modernization and ex-
pansion of their shorter-range TNF and 
greatly improved the overall quality of 
their conventional forces. These devel-
opments took place against the back-
ground of increasing Soviet inter-conti-
nental capabilities and achievement of 
parity in inter-continental capability with 
the United States. 
5. These trends have prompted serious 
concern within the Alliance, because, if 
they were to continue, Soviet superiority 
in theatre nuclear systems could under-
mine the stability achieved in inter-conti-
nental systems and cast doubt on the 
credibility of the Alliance's deterrent 
strategy by highlighting the gap in the 
spectrum of NATO's available nuclear re-
sponse to aggression. 
6. Ministers noted that these recent de-
velopments require concrete actions on 
the part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy 
of flexible response is to remain credible. 
After intensive consideration, including 
the merits of alternative approaches, and 
after taking note of the positions of cer-
tain members, Ministers concluded that 
the overall interest of the Alliance could 
best be served by pursuing two parallel 
and complementary approaches of TNF 
modernization and arms control. 
7. Accordingly Ministers have decided 
to modernize NATO's LRTNF by the de-
ployment in Europe of US ground-
launched systems comprising 108 
Pershing II launches, which would re-
place existing US Pershing 1-A, and 464 
Ground Launched Cruise Missiles 
(GLCM), all with single warheads. All the 
nations currently participating in the in-
tegrated defence structure will particip-
ate in the programme: the missiles will be 
stationed in selected countries and cer-
tain support costs will be met through 
NATO's existing common funding arran-
gements. The programme will not in-
crease NATO's reliance upon nuclear 
weapons. In this connection,Ministers 
agreed that as an integral part ofTNF mo-
dernization, 1000 US nuclear warheads 
will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as 
feasible. Further, Ministers decided that 
the 572 LRTNF warheads should be ac-
commodated within that reduced level, 
which necessarly implies a numerical 
shift of emphasis away from warheads 
for delivery systems of other types and 
shorter ranges. In addition they noted 
with satisfaction that the Nuclear Plan-
ning Group is undertaking an examina-
tion ofthe precise nature, scope and ba-
sis of the adjustments resulting from the 
LRTNF deployment and their possible 
implications for the balance of rOles and 
systems in NATO's nuclear armoury as a 
whole. Ths examination will form the ba-
sis of a substantive report to NPG Mi-
nisters in the Autumn of 1980. 
8. Ministers attach great importance to 
the rOle of arms control in contributing to 
a more stable military relationship be-
tween East and West and in advancing 
the process of detente. This is reflected 
in a broad set of initiatives being exam-
ined within the Alliance to further the 
course of arms conrol and detente in the 
1980s. Ministers regard arms conrol as 
an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to 
assure the undiminished security of its 
member States and to make the strate-
gic situation between East and West 
more stable, more predictable, and more 
manageable at lower levels of arma-
ments on both sides. In this regard they 
welcome the contribution which the 
SALT II Treaty makes towards achieving 
these objectives. 
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9. Ministers consider that, building on 
this accomplishment and taking ac-
count of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF 
capabilities of concern to NATO, arms 
conrol efforts to achieve a more stable 
overall nuclear balance at lower levels of 
nuclear weapons on both sides should 
therefore now include certain US and 
Soviet long-range theatre nuclear sys-
tems. This would reflect previous Wes-
tern suggestions to include such Soviet 
and US systems in arms conrol negotia-
tions and more recent expressions by 
Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness 
to do so. Ministers fully support the deci-
sion taken by the United States following 
consultations within the Alliance to ne-
gotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to 
propose to the USSR to begin negotia-
tions as soon as possible along the fol-
lowing lines which have been elaborated 
in intensive consultations within the Alli-
ance: 
A. Any future limitations on US systems 
principally designed for theatre missions 
should be accompanied by appropriate 
limitations on Soviet theatre systems. 
B. Limitations on US and Soviet long-
range theatre nuclear systems should 
be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT Ill 
framework in a step-by-step approach. 
C. The immediate objective of these ne-
gotiations should be the establishment 
of agreed limitations on US and Soviet 
land-based long-range theatre nuclear 
missile systems. 
D. Any agreed limitations on these sys-
tems must be consistent with the prin-
ciple of equality between the sides. 
Therefore, the limitations should take the 
form of de jure equality both in ceilings 
and in rights. 
E. Any agreed limitations must be ade-
quately verifiable. 
1 0. Given the special importance of 
these negotiations for the overall secur-
ity of the Alliance, a special consultative 
body at a high level will be constituted 
within the Alliance to support the US ne-
gotiating effort. This body will follow the 
negotiations on a continuous basis and 
report to the Foreign and Defence Minis-
ters who will examine developments in 
these negotiations as well as in other 
arms control negotiations at their semi-
annual meetings. 
11. The Ministers have decided to pur-
sue these two parallel and complemen-
tary approaches in orderto avert an arms 
race in Europe caused bytheSovietTNF 
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build-up, yet preserve the viability of 
NATO's strategy of deterrence and def-
ence and thus maintain the security of its 
member States. 
A. A modernization decision, including 
a commitment to deployments, is neces-
sary to meet NATO's deterrence and def-
ence needs, to provide a credible re-
sponse to unilateral Soviet TNF deploy-
ments, and to provide the foundation for 
the pursuit of serious negotiations on 
TN F. 
B. Success of arms control in con-
straining the Soviet build-up can en-
hance Alliance security, modify the scale 
of NATO's TNF requirements, and pro-
mote stability and detente in Europe in 
consonance with NATO's basic policy of 
deterrence, defence and detente as 
enunciated in the Harmel Report. 
NATO's TNF requirements will be exa-
mined in the light of concrete results 
reached through negotiations. 
Special Meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers, Brussels, 12 December1979 
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Resolution of 
16November 
1983 on the 
Deployment 
of Missiles 
in Western 
Europe 
The European Parliament, 
A. aware that in broad sections of the 
European population there is con-
cern regarding the danger of war, 
B. convinced that pacifism and ap-
peasement policy are not an appro-
priate reaction to the threat to Wes-
tern Europe, 
C. dismayed atthe attempt of a Member 
State to make use of European Politi-
cal ·Co-operation to discuss the 
question of intermediate-range mis-
siles in Europe, a matter exclusively 
in the range of jurisdiction of the At-
lantic Alliance, 
D. making reference to the fact that a 
Member State of the Community 
does not belong to the Atlantic Alli-
ance and that a further Member 
State, although a member of the Alli-
ance, does not participate in its inte-
grated military command structure, 
E. making reference to the report 
adopted in 1983 on European Politi-
cal Co-operation and European Se-
curity (Doc. 1-946/82) which states 
"that arms control talks between 
East and West are of mutual interest, 
must have the character of a contin-
ous process and be oriented to-
wards the goal of mutual security on 
the basis of a balance of military 
forces at the lowest possible level, 
F. noting with satisfaction that the 
rights and duties of the European 
Parliament regarding the discussion 
of European security receive broad 
political support, aware however that 
the institutions of the European 
Community possess no explicit 
competence for military matters, 
1. rejects the attempts undertaken by 
the government of a Member State 
and by certain political forces to ex-
ploit European Political Co-opera-
tion for the purpose of changing the 
position agreed upon among the go-
vernments of the EC Member States 
and the other countries in the Atlant-
ic Alliance in the crucial question of 
missile deployment, 
2. supports the governments of the 
Member States that are firmly re-
solved to preserve the balance of 
forces necessary in the interest of 
the security of our States and the en-
tire West, 
3. expresses the hope that the current 
and future negotiations on arms con-
trol, arms reductions and confiden-
ce-building measures will render a 
significant contribution to peace and 
security in Europe, 
4. points out the grave danger that the 
Western negotiating position in Ge-
neva will be undermined by the sup-
port of proposals that deprive the 
West of an important weapons cate-
gory, but would grant the other side 
the unaltered deployment of a large 
number of these weapons, 
5. requests for this reason the support 
of all Member States for a double 
strategy consisting of serious arms 
control negotiations leading to a re-
duction of all arsenals, whether nuc-
lear, chemical or conventional, to the 
lowest possible level commensurate 
with the security needs of Western 
Europe and, until this goal is 
reached, the preservation of a posi-
tion of military strength sufficient to 
deter egression and intimidation 
from the outside and in this way pro-
vide the other side with the neces-
sary incentive to negotiate agree-
ments on mutual and verifiable disar-
mament measures, 
6. request that its President convey this 
resolution to the Foreign Ministers of 
the Member States meeting in the 
context of Political Co-operation. 
(Result of the vote: 170 for, 108 
against, 26 abstained.) 
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Press Reaction to INF 
Deployment in the Federal 
Republic of Gennany 
Comments 
• m 
Cartoons 
"Thafs not fair. Your knife is bigger than mine" 
What do we do now Commander Kohl? 
(Osnabrilck) 
"I' II be damned. They really are serious about scrapping deployed systems." Wolter 
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Wolter 
E.M.Lang 
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ffi6clnifwcr 
(Koblenz) • 
The dropout of the year Hanel 
1/\IESTDEUTSCHE 
.;;...ALLG E.M.E INE 
(Essen) 
Doves of peace 1983-style Klaus Pielert 
._tilnifd)e ~unDfd)au 
(Killn) 
Parliamentary rift Gerboth ... and yet another new argument ... Haitzinger 
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Federal Republic of Germany· 
Press and Information Office 
'' ... preventing any type 
of war in Europe.'' 
the conclusion of equitable and verifi-
able agreements on arms limitations and 
disarmament. We have noted with great 
concern the year-by-year build-up of a 
land-based intermediate-range nuclear 
potential, most of which is targeted on 
Western Europe. Western Europe can-
not accept a state of lessened security. A 
destabilization of the peace-preserving 
balance of forces cannot be in the inte-
rest of the rest of the world either. 
From a speech given by Chancel-
lor Helmut Kohl on the occasion 
of a reception for the Diplomatic 
Corps on 28 November 1983 
For us Germans, in our special situation 
in the heart of Europe, divided by an un-
natural frontier at the interface between 
East and West, the preservation of peace 
is an question of existential importance. 
We Germans do not separate peace from 
freedom. In bitter past experience we 
first lost freedom and then peace. Thus it 
has been and will continue to be the 
supreme objective of all governments of 
the Federal Republic of Germany to safe-
guard peace and freedom. 
Our membership in the Atlantic Alliance 
and the European Community is an ex-
pression of common fundamental con-
victions regarding democracy, self-de-
termination, human rights and social jus-
tice. 
On this basis we strive for constructive 
and stable relations with our neighbours 
in Central and Eastern Europe, including 
the Soviet Union. We adhere to the trea-
ties we conclude. We act in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations 
and with the Rnal Act of Helsinki. The aim 
of our policy in relations between East 
and West is the reduction of tensions, 
the building of confidence and the ex-
pansion of co-operation. We conduct 
and promote an active and comprehen-
sive dialogue to this end. 
Our defence effort is, like that of our al-
lies, exclusively aimed at preventing any 
type of war in Europe. TheAtlanticAIIian-
ce and its members have committed 
themselves to strict respect oft he princi-
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pie ofthe renunciation offorce as a basic 
prerequisite of peace. 
We would like to see peace safeguarded 
with ever fewer weapons. Our aim is a 
stable balance of forces at the lowest 
possible level. For this reason the Go-
vernment ofthe Federal Republic of Ger-
many advocates in all areas and in all fora 
The resolutions of the Alliance and the 
United States' conduct oft he talks in Ge-
neva show that we are emphatically and 
steadfastly seeking a negotiated solu-
tion. 
At the suggestion of Foreign Minister Genscher the 
NATO Council adopted a "Brussels Declaration" on 
9 December 1983 conceived of as a political signal in-
tended to bring about a resumption of the dialogue be-
tween East and West in this time of tension. 
A signal to the East from the autumn meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in 
Brussels. · sz Cartoon by Leger 
